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Abstract 
 
We study the effects of financial structure and financial development on banking fragility. 
We develop our study by using fixed-effects panel-data regressions and by controlling the 
effects of certain banking indicators. We use individual and principal-components 
indicators of the activity, size and efficiency of intermediaries and markets. The 
indicators include data for 211 countries between 1990 and 2003. Our main findings 
suggest that banking stability is enhanced in market-based financial systems. Financial 
development reduces it.  However this fragility-enhancing effect can be unveiled only 
when we account for financial structure. Thus, financial structure and development jointly 
matter to assess banking fragility.  
 
 
Resumen 
 
Estudiamos los efectos de la estructura financiera y el desarrollo financiero en la 
fragilidad bancaria. Nuestro estudio se desarrolla con regresiones para datos de panel con 
efectos fijos y controlando los efectos de ciertos indicadores bancarios. Usamos 
indicadores individuales y de componentes principales, que evalúan la actividad, tamaño 
y eficiencia de los intermediarios y mercados financieros. Los indicadores incluyen datos 
para 211 países entre 1990 y 2003. Nuestros hallazgos sugieren que la estabilidad 
bancaria se incrementa en sistemas financieros donde predominan los mercados. El 
desarrollo financiero la reduce. Sin embargo, este efecto desestabilizador es evidente solo 
cuando se considera la estructura financiera.   Así, la estructura financiera y el desarrollo 
financiero conjuntamente influyen en la fragilidad bancaria. 
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FIACIAL STRUCTURE, FIACIAL DEVELOPMET AD BAKIG 
FRAGILITY: ITERATIOAL EVIDECE 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the main concerns among economists relates to the study of the determinants of 
banking crises. Particularly, financial structure determinants have been considered 
important to understand them [Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998)]. Here we study 
the effects of financial determinants on banking fragility. We develop our study by using 
panel-data techniques and by controlling for banking activity, size and concentration. We 
use indicators of the activity, size and efficiency of intermediaries and markets for 211 
countries during the period 1990-2003. 
 
The study is motivated by the necessity to understand the determinants of banking crises. 
Particularly, our interest on the financial determinants relates to an old concern in 
economics about the effects that financial systems may have on the performance of the 
agents within an economy and the economy itself.
1
 This concern has encouraged the 
development of theories and empirical research to assess the relative merits of different 
financial systems. However we are far from a consensus about which financial systems 
may contribute to achieve specific goals, like financial stability.  
 
We believe that the understanding the financial determinants is particularly relevant to 
avoid the economic costs of banking crises. Solely the costs of the recent global financial 
                                                           
1
 Such concern can be traced back to the writings of Bagehot (1873). See Levine (2002) and Allen and Gale 
(2004) for reviews on the relationships between financial structure and economic performance. 
 2 
crisis of 2007-2008 have been estimated above 1.4 trillion US dollars [IMF (2008:xiii)].
 2
 
This crisis, the worst since World War II, has been considered as “a modern form of a 
traditional banking crisis” [Vives (2008:99)]. Moreover, according to several authors, its 
origins can be traced on issues related to financial structure and financial development.
3
 
Thus, the study of these determinants might contribute to avoid further costly crises.  
 
The necessity to develop further investigations on the determinants of banking fragility 
cannot be minimised. The literature on the impacts of financial structure on banking 
crises is relatively scarce and in an early stage of development. Until recently, issues 
regarding data availability, accounting, regulatory and economic methods have inhibited 
the development of such studies.  Indeed, existing studies on the relationship between 
financial structure and banking fragility are mainly descriptive.
4
 Thus there is no reliable 
guide regarding how to avoid financial crises in national or global contexts.  
 
We aim at clarifying how financial structure and financial development determinants may 
relate to banking fragility by suggesting answers to the following questions: Does 
financial structure matter to assess banking performance? What are the effects, if any, of 
financial structure and development on banking crises? Can we analyse these two 
determinants independently one of another? Which type of implications may be derived 
from these findings? Here we analyse these questions by using a variation of the failure-
determinant methodology that includes panel-data regressions. 
                                                           
2
 See Barrel and Davies (2008) for a summary of the evolution of the financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
3
 See Felton and Reinhart (2008) for a compilation of essays among academic economists and policymakers 
about the origins, evolution and policy responses to the global financial crisis.  
4
 To our knowledge the first study on this relationship is the one of Allen (2001).  
 3 
 
We develop this study in three stages. First we build the financial indicators based on 
measures of activity, size and efficiency of intermediaries and markets. Later we estimate 
the individual and joint effects of financial development and structure on banking fragility 
with three sets of fixed-effects logit regressions for panel-data. Finally we use omitted-
variable tests to evaluate the pertinence of the joint study of the effects of financial 
structure and development. We use individual and principal-components indicators for the 
empirical assessments. 
 
Methodologically, our study has some specific features that differentiate it with respect to 
others: A first feature is that we use internationally comparable data from the most 
extensive datasets publicly available for 211 economies during the period 1990-2003.
5
 
The second one is that we use panel-data techniques that allow us to control the effects of 
time-constant unobserved heterogeneity among countries. Finally the last distinctive 
feature of our study is that we analyse the effects of individual and aggregate indicators of 
financial structure and development on banking fragility. 
  
Our econometric results have implications for theoretical and practical purposes. 
Specifically the assessments suggest that financial structure and financial development 
jointly matter to assess the stability of banking systems. Banking stability is enhanced in 
economies with market-based financial systems. Financial development reduces it.  
                                                           
5
 We use panel-data extracted from the database on financial development and structure [Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine (2006)], and from the datasets on episodes of systemic and borderline banking crises 
[Caprio and Klingebiel (2003)]. The datasets are available at the World Bank´s website: 
http://econ.worldbank.org 
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However the latter fragility-enhancing effect can be unveiled only when we account for 
financial structure. Furthermore our findings suggest that the size of the banking sector 
seems to reduce banking stability and that lending activities enhance it. 
 
This study complements and extends the ones of Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) 
and the ones of Ruiz-Porras (2006) and (2008). The first study shows that economies with 
low growth rates, high rates of inflation and interest rates and BOP problems are likely to 
experience crises. The second study describes the “stylised facts”, between financial 
systems and banking crises. Concretely, it shows that crises are more likely in bank-based 
financial systems and that financial development enhances banking stability. Finally the 
third study analyses the relationship between banking competition and banking crises. 
 
The article is organised in seven sections. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 
describes the data. Section 4 discusses methodological issues. Section 5 shows the 
outcomes of the individual assessments of the effects of financial structure and 
development.  Section 6 focuses on the joint analysis of such effects and its econometric 
justification. Section 7 summarises and discusses the main findings. The appendixes 
include further econometric estimations and indicate the countries and data of recognised 
banking crises used in the study. 
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2. Financial structure, financial development and banking fragility 
Theory suggests that the opportunities to deal with financial risks and to engage on risk 
sharing activities depend on the particular properties of financial systems [see Allen and 
Gale (2000) and (2004)]. Financial competition among financial markets and banks, 
which is reflected on the financial structure of an economy, provides different incentives 
and opportunities for risk management. The management of risks is the main activity of 
banks. Thus, it is very likely that banking performance, and the likelihood of crises, may 
depend on the structure and degree of development of the financial systems.    
 
Why financial structure may be related to the likelihood of banking crises? According to 
the theory on comparative financial systems, such relationship can be explained in terms 
of financial competition.  Competition between markets and banks erodes the 
opportunities to engage in inter-temporal risk smoothing activities [See Allen and Gale 
(2000) and (2004)]. Such erosion is particularly relevant because banking crises have 
been defined as equilibrium outcomes in a context of inter-temporal risk sharing [See 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983)].
6
    
 
However, we must emphasise that the relationship between financial systems and banking 
crises may not be a straightforward one. Theory has not dealt enough with issues 
regarding how risks may influence intermediaries´ behaviour [see Allen and Santomero 
(1997) and Scholtens and Van Wensveen (2000)]. We cannot dismiss the possibility of 
bidirectional effects between financial development and banking crises. Historically, 
banking crises have had a significant impact on the development of financial systems.  
 6 
 
Empirical studies that assess how different financial structures may affect the 
performance of banks in an international context are scarce. The first study that analyses 
the relationship between financial structure and banking performance is the one of 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001). Among their findings, they show that in emerging 
economies, financial systems tend to be bank-based and relatively underdeveloped. 
However they do not find any conclusive evidence to support the hypothesis that financial 
structure has a significant, independent influence on bank margins and profits. 
 
The hypothesis that financial structure matters to explain banking fragility has been 
explicitly stated by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998).
7
 Such hypothesis has support 
on the study of Ruiz-Porras (2006). There he finds that financial development is 
associated to market-based financial systems and that such association is magnified 
during episodes of banking crises. Thus, he concludes that financial structure, 
development and banking crises are interrelated. Such conclusion is reached by analysing 
data for 47 economies during the period 1990-1997. 
 
Further studies provide indirect evidence to support the idea that financial determinants 
might explain banking crises. Among these studies, we include the ones of Loayza and 
Ranciere (2006) and Evrensel (2008). The first study shows that financial liberalisation, 
as a mean of financial development and change in financial structures, can generate short-
                                                                                                                                                                             
6
 See De Bandt and Hartmann (2002) for a survey on systemic risk in banking. 
7
 Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998:105) indicate that “variables that capture the structure of the 
banking system and, more generally, the structure of financial markets…, are likely to play an important 
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run financial instability and long-run growth. The second one suggests that financial and 
economic development and banking concentration might delay banking crises. In both 
studies, financial development seems to be a significant determinant. 
 
Methodologically, we should point out that none of the previous empirical studies is a 
failure-determinant one. This type of studies attempts to explain recognised insolvency 
situations among intermediaries or troubled banking systems. They seek to identify, ex-
post, the factors that may affect the likelihood of banking problems. Currently there are 
not failure-determinant studies that have focused on how financial structure determinants 
may affect banking crises.
8
  So, the development of such studies may to be particularly 
necessary to improve our understanding on banking fragility. 
We are far from a consensus regarding the effects of financial determinants on banking 
crises. The theoretical and empirical literature on comparative financial systems is rather 
limited and inconclusive to deal with this issue. Particularly, we believe that further 
failure-determinant studies may be useful at clarifying the relationships between financial 
systems and banking fragility.  
 
3. Banking and financial indicators 
Here we describe the financial and banking indicators used in our study.  Such indicators 
are built according to the guidelines proposed by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) 
and Levine (2002). Thus, we consider as a stable banking system as one that does not 
                                                                                                                                                                             
role in breeding banking crises, but they are neglected here because of lack of data.  A study limited to a 
smaller set of countries that includes more structural variables might yield to more interesting results”.  
8
 Ruiz-Porras (2008) includes aggregate financial structure and development determinants as control 
variables to assess the relationship between banking competition and banking fragility for 47 economies 
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experience a recognised episode of borderline or systemic banking crisis.  In addition, we 
follow the convention that financial development depends to the level of development of 
both intermediaries and markets. Finally we consider that financial structure depends on 
the degree to which a financial system is based on intermediaries or markets.  
 
We build the financial structure and development indicators with panel-data extracted 
from the revised dataset of Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2006). We captured the 
main features of the financial and banking environment. We use the datasets of Caprio 
and Klingebiel (2003) to build the qualitative indicators of fragility. Datasets allow us to 
build our sample of financial and banking indicators. The main advantage of using these 
datasets is that they provide us with consistent data across countries and across time.   
 
We combine the three datasets to develop our failure-determinant study for the period 
1990-2003 [See Table 1].
 9
 Here it is worthy to indicate that the dataset of Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2006) includes panel-data for 211 countries for the period 
1960-2004.  Specifically, the dataset includes data for 58 low-income, 54 lower-middle, 
40 upper-middle, 32 high-income-non-OECD and 26 high-income-OECD countries. The 
datasets of Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) include data on recognised borderline and 
systemic episodes of banking crises for several countries during the period 1974-2003.
 10
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
during the period 1990-1997. His findings suggest that the orientation toward marked-based financial 
systems might enhance banking stability. 
9
 The countries and episodes of banking crises considered in our study are contained in Appendix B. 
10
 A limitation of the datasets of Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) refers to the characterisation and coverage of 
banking crises. In many countries, banking problems are underestimated and also the size of their costs. 
Moreover, the time span of banking crises is not easy to determine. Even at a mere qualitative level, the 
characterisation of crises may be difficult to establish for certain countries because they are not officially 
recognised. Thus, we cannot dismiss the possibility that certain “periods of banking stability”, in our 
database, may occur in reality due to missing or non reported data on banking crisis episodes.     
 9 
Table 1. Financial and Banking Data 
 
 
 
Definition 
 
 
Variable 
 
Period 
 
Countries 
(Crises) 
 
Observations 
(Crises) 
 
Banking fragility variables 
Dummy variable on borderline 
episodes of banking fragility 
(Banking crisis=1, otherwise=0) 
 
BORDER 
 
1974-2003 
 
211 
(44) 
 
6330 
(278) 
Dummy variable on systemic 
episodes of banking fragility  
(Banking crisis=1, otherwise=0) 
 
SYSTEMIC 
 
1974-2003 
 
211 
(92) 
 
6330 
(697) 
 
Financial structure and development variables 
Private credit by deposit money 
banks and other financial 
institutions to GDP  
(Private credit ratio) 
 
PCRDBOFGDP 
 
1960-2004 
 
161 
 
 
4597 
 
Stock market capitalisation to 
GDP (Market capitalisation ratio) 
 
 
STMKTCAP 
 
1976-2004 
 
111 
 
 
1541 
 
Stock market total value traded to 
GDP 
(Total value traded ratio) 
 
STVALTRADED 
 
1975-2004 
 
111 
 
 
1588 
 
 
Banking system variables 
Concentration  
(Ratio of the 3 largest banks to 
total banking assets 
 
CONCENTRATION 
 
1990-2004 
 
160 
 
 
1790 
 
Deposit money bank assets to 
GDP (Bank size ratio) 
 
DBAGDP 
 
1960-2004 
 
161 
 
 
4606 
 
Overhead costs of the banking 
system relative to banking system 
assets 
 
OVERHEAD 
 
1990-2004 
 
158 
 
 
1738 
 
Private credit by  deposit money 
banks to GDP (Bank credit ratio) 
 
 
PCRDBGDP 
 
1960-2004 
 
161 
 
 
4582 
 
Notes:  
- The database on banking crises includes the two qualitative variables included here. A banking crisis 
is defined as systemic if most or all banking system capital is eroded by loan losses (5% of assets in 
developing countries). A non systemic banking crisis includes borderline and smaller banking crises. 
- Annual observations associated to episodes of recognised banking crises are given in parenthesis.   
- The complete financial development and structure database includes statistics on the size, activity and 
efficiency of various intermediaries (commercial banks, insurance companies, pension funds and non-
deposit money banks) and markets (primary equity and primary and secondary bond markets). 
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Methodologically, we define nine individual indicators to describe the financial and 
banking environments prevailing in every country every year according to data 
availability. We organise these indicators into three assortments. The structural 
assortment contains measures of the activity, size and efficiency of stock markets relative 
to that of banks. The development assortment contains measures of the activity, size and 
efficiency of stock markets and banks. Finally the banking assortment contains measures 
of activity, size and concentration of banking systems.  
 
We follow Levine (2002) to build the financial assortments that capture the specific 
features of the financial system in a country. The structural assortment is integrated by the 
Structure-Activity, Structure-Size and Structure-Efficiency indicators. Here market-based 
financial systems are associated to large values of the indicators and bank-based ones to 
small values. The development assortment is integrated by the Finance-Activity, Finance-
Size and Finance-Efficiency indicators.
 
Financial development is associated to large 
values of the indicators and underdevelopment to small ones.
11
 
 
We summarise the information content of these assortments by using two aggregate 
indicators of financial structure and development. We follow the approach of Levine 
(2002) to define them. Such indicators are built with principal-component methods. 
Specifically they are the Structure-Aggregate and the Finance-Aggregate ones. We use 
the aggregate indicators as indexes of scale for the level of development and of the 
                                                           
11
 The financial indicators may have limitations to describe the main features of financial systems. 
Particularly, Levine (2002) indicates that the Finance-Size and the Structure-Efficiency indicators have 
some problems to be considered good measures of financial development and financial structure. Here we 
include these indicators for completeness and consistency with other studies. 
 11 
relative prominence of markets in the financial system. These two indicators complement 
the previous ones included in the structure and development assortments. 
 
Finally we describe the main features of the banking sector with the third assortment. The 
banking assortment is integrated by the Banking-Activity, Banking-Size and Banking-
Concentration indicators. Large values of the first two indicators are associated to high 
levels of credit activity and to a large size of banking assets [See Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2001)]. High values of the last indicator are associated to concentrated banking 
systems. We use these three indicators as control variables in the panel-data models. They 
are included here under the basis of data availability.
12
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 We are aware that important control variables are missing. We do not include them due to the lack of 
data. These omissions include economic indicators and variables to describe different regulatory regimes.  
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Table 2. Banking and Financial Indicators 
 
 
 
ame 
 
Definition 
 
Measurement  
 
Banking Fragility Indicators 
 
Crises 
 
Binary variable for fragility: 
Banking crisis=1 
Non banking crisis=0 
Recognised episodes of 
systemic and/or borderline 
banking crises 
Financial Structure Indicators 
 
Structure Activity 
 





=
PCRDBGDP
DSTVALTRADE
lnSTCACT  
Activity of stock markets 
relative to that of banks  
 
Structure Size 
 





=
PCRDBGDP
 STMKTCAP
lnSTCSIZ  
Size of stock markets relative to 
that of banks 
 
Structure Efficiency 
 
( )OVERHEAD * DSTVALTRADEln
=STCEFF  
 
Efficiency of stock markets 
relative to that of banks 
 
Structure Aggregate 
 
First principal component of the 
set of individual financial 
structure indicators. 
Scale index of financial 
structure.  
Financial Development Indicators 
 
Finance Activity 
 
 
( )PCRDBOFGDP * DSTVALTRADEln
=FI'ACT  Activity of stock markets and 
intermediaries  
 
Finance Size 
 
( )PCRDBOFGDP * STMKTCAPln
=FI'SIZ  Size of stock markets and 
intermediaries 
 
Finance Efficiency 
 





=
OVERHEAD
DSTVALTRADE
lnFI'EFF  
Financial sector efficiency  
 
Finance Aggregate 
 
First principal component of the 
set of individual financial 
development indicators. 
Scale index of financial 
development.   
Banking System Indicators 
 
Banking Activity 
 
( )PCRDBGDPln=B'KACT
 
Credit activity of the banking 
system 
 
Banking Size 
 
( )DBAGDPln=B'KSIZ
 
Overall size of the banking 
sector 
 
Banking Concentration 
 
( )IONCONCENTRATln
=B'KCO'  Banking system concentration 
Notes: The characterisation of the financial and banking systems depends on the indicators´ relative 
value (with respect to the sample medians). Large values of the financial structure indicators are 
associated to market-based financial systems; small ones to bank-based ones. Large values of the 
financial development indicators relate to high levels of financial development.      
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4. Methodological issues on the econometric assessment 
In this section we discuss some methodological issues regarding our assessment on the 
effects of financial determinants on banking fragility.  Particularly, we define the scope 
and limits of our research. From an empirical perspective, its main distinctive feature is 
that the failure-determinant framework relies on fixed-effects logit models for panel-data. 
We combine the properties of time-series and cross-sectional data for estimation 
purposes. The assessment is based on estimations of three functional form specifications.  
 
We assess the effects of financial structure and development by estimating the 
probabilities of occurrence of banking crises according to the conventions of the failure-
determinant literature. Specifically, given cross-country annual data for n  economies, we 
have that, for each period t, the i-country is either experiencing a banking crisis, or it is 
not. The probability that a crisis may to occur is hypothesised to be a function of a matrix 
of K vector-variables itKititit xxxx ,...,, 21= .  Such matrix describes the financial 
environment through the inclusion of failure-determinant and control variables.  
 
We study the specific and joint effects of financial determinants with three subunits of the 
independent-variable matrix itx . We differentiate each specification by using a 
superscript. The first design Sitx  focuses on the effects of the financial structure indicators. 
The second one Fitx  focuses on the effects of the financial development. The last 
SF
itx  
focuses on the joint effects of both indicators. Thus the set of designs of the matrix itx  is:  
[ ]ititFit BF ,,0=x         (1) 
 14 
[ ]ititSit BS ,0,=x         (2) 
[ ]itititSFit BFS ,,=x         (3) 
Where 
 itS  Vector of financial structure indicators   
 itF  Vector of financial development indicators 
itB  Vector of banking indicators 
 
Our analysis is based on estimations of linear functional forms that relate the coefficient 
vector β  with the matrix itx . Linearity is a convention in the failure-determinant 
literature. Here denominate the specification that relates Sitx  and [ ]BSS ββ ,0,=β  as the 
financial-structure specification (FS specification). We denominate the one that relates 
F
itx  and [ ]BFF ββ ,,0=β as the financial-development specification (FD specification). 
Finally we denominate the joint specification that relates SFitx  and [ ]BFSSF βββ ,,=β as 
the financial-structure-and-development specification (FSD specification).  
 
The analysis of how financial structure and development may affect the stability of 
banking systems depends on several estimations of the coefficient vector β .  We use 
these estimations to clarify the effects of the financial system determinants. The 
assessment of each specification depends on four estimations; three estimations for the 
individual indicators and one to the aggregate indicators. We do not combine indicators of 
the same type due to the potential multicollinearity that may exist among them.  
 
 15 
Econometrically, it can be argued that endogeneity may arise in our assessment 
framework. Endogeneity can arise due to the omission of relevant variables or or because 
of simultaneity. Here we deal with endogeneity issues with likelihood-ratio (LR) tests for 
omitted variable bias. Such tests assume that SFitx  includes irrelevant variables and that 
the Sitx , and 
F
itx  may be correctly specified. Thus the hypothesis that financial structure 
and development effects must to be analysed jointly predicts that the null hypothesis of 
correct specification of Sitx , or 
F
itx  will be rejected. 
 
Furthermore, endogeneity and causality problems may be related. Here we use lags of the 
independent variables to avoid potential simultaneity and endogeneity problems arising 
from potential two-way relationships. In addition, we deal with causality issues 
postulating certain hypotheses about the signs for the estimated coefficients. Specifically, 
the hypothesis that market-based financial systems enhance banking stability, predicts 
that the estimated signs of Sβ will be negative. The hypothesis that financial development 
also enhances stability, predicts that the signs of Fβ will be negative too.
13
  
 
5. Econometric assessment of the effects of the individual determinants
14
 
Here we report the outcomes of the sets of models used to assess the specific effects of 
the financial determinants on banking crises. The outcomes associated to the eight 
estimations of the specifications defined by equations (1) and (2). We compare the 
                                                           
13
  Notice that our study assumes that the design of the financial and banking systems and the level of 
financial development are exogenous of banking crises. this is a very restrictive assumption. 
14
 The econometric software used for the assessments is Stata 9.0.   
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evidence with the theoretical predictions. All the estimations included the banking 
indicators as control variables and the lagged financial indicators as independent ones.   
 
The first set of failure-determinants models focuses on the effects of the financial 
structure determinants on fragility. We summarise their results in Table 3.  
 
  Table 3. Financial Structure and Banking Crises 
( FS specification) 
 
 
Model 
 
Aggregate 
 
Activity 
 
Size 
 
Efficiency 
 
 
Regression Indicators 
Structure Aggregate 
(lagged) 
-1.03*** 
(-4.64) 
- - - 
Structure Activity 
(lagged) 
- -0.64*** 
(-4.35) 
- - 
Structure Size 
(lagged) 
- - -0.83*** 
(-3.31) 
- 
Structure Efficiency 
(lagged) 
- - - -0.85*** 
(-4.97) 
Banking Activity -4.29*** 
(-3.84) 
-5.07*** 
(-4.64) 
-5.43*** 
(-4.89) 
-3.79*** 
(-3.43) 
Banking Size 4.99*** 
(3.72) 
5.74*** 
(4.57) 
6.20*** 
(4.84) 
4.98*** 
(3.82) 
Banking 
Concentration 
0.99 
(1.05) 
0.40 
(0.58) 
0.80 
(1.07) 
1.03 
(1.18) 
Observations 339 431 411 371 
LR-CHI2(4) 67.00*** 63.44*** 55.49*** 68.81*** 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -119.92 -158.77 -155.68 -129.43 
Notes: The dependent variable is the banking crisis dummy. The z statistics are given in parenthesis and 
are based on IRLS variance estimators. One, two and three asterisks indicate significance levels of 10, 5 
and 1 percent respectively. 
 
Table 3 shows that the likelihood of banking crises is associated to a relative decrease in 
the level of activity of stock markets with respect to that of banks. All the financial 
structure determinants are negative and statistically significant (1 percent significance 
level). The consistency of the estimated associations holds independently of the specific 
 17 
failure-determinant model estimated. Thus the evidence suggests that market-based 
financial systems enhance banking stability. Thus, it seems that financial structure matters 
to assess the stability of banking systems. 
 
The second set of failure-determinants models focuses on the effects of the financial 
development determinants on fragility. We summarise their results in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Financial Development and Banking Crises 
( FD specification) 
 
 
Model 
 
Aggregate 
 
Activity 
 
Size 
 
Efficiency 
 
 
Regression Indicators 
Finance Aggregate 
(lagged) 
-1.01*** 
(-3.31) 
- - - 
Finance Activity 
(lagged) 
- -0.49*** 
(-3.34) 
- - 
Finance Size 
(lagged) 
- - -0.36 
(-1.57) 
- 
Finance Efficiency 
(lagged) 
- - - -0.63*** 
(-4.05) 
Banking Activity -3.60*** 
(-3.07) 
-4.33*** 
(-3.90) 
-5.01*** 
(-4.20) 
-3.74*** 
(-3.36) 
Banking Size 5.23*** 
(3.93) 
5.91*** 
(4.77) 
6.47*** 
(5.01) 
5.00*** 
(3.83) 
Banking 
Concentration 
1.41 
(1.48) 
0.60 
(0.84) 
1.25 
(1.62) 
1.47* 
(1.71) 
Observations 339 431 411 371 
LR-CHI2(4) 52.81*** 54.15*** 45.79*** 57.30*** 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -127.01 -163.41 -160.53 -135.18 
Notes: The dependent variable is the banking crisis dummy. The z statistics are given in parenthesis and 
are based on IRLS variance estimators. One, two and three asterisks indicate significance levels of 10, 5 
and 1 percent respectively. 
   
Table 4 reports the outcomes associated to the financial-development specification. It 
shows that the likelihood of banking crises is associated to a relative decrease in the level 
of development of intermediaries and financial markets. All the financial development 
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determinants are negative and most of them are statistically significant (1 percent 
significance level). Again, the consistency of the estimated associations holds 
independently of the specific failure-determinant model estimated. Thus the estimations 
suggest that financial development might enhance banking stability. 
  
What effects may have banking system features on banking fragility? The estimations in 
the previous tables suggest that the indicators have differentiated effects on the likelihood 
of banking crises.  Specifically the size of the banking sector seems to increase it and 
banking credit activity seems to reduce it. In all cases, the estimations are consistent and 
significant. The evidence also suggests that banking concentration might increase banking 
fragility. However, in none of the estimated models such variable is significant. Here we 
should point out that some of these findings are counterintuitive. 
 
We support our results with statistical tests. Specifically, we support the adequacy of the 
estimated failure-determinant models with likelihood-ratio tests [See Tables 3 and 4]. In 
all cases, such test rejects the null hypothesis that all the parameters of the models are 
zero. Furthermore, according to comparisons of the log-likelihood indicators, the 
aggregate models may be the ones that best describe the individual effects of financial 
structure and development. This finding may not be surprising. However, we should 
emphasise that, by the moment, we cannot reject the possibility of omitted variable bias. 
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6. Econometric assessment of the joint effects of financial structure and development 
determinants 
Here we report the outcomes of the sets of models used to assess the joint effects of the 
financial determinants on banking crises. We report the outcomes associated to the four 
estimations of the specification defined by equation (3). Furthermore we report the 
outcomes of the tests of omitted variable bias. Such outcomes will allow us to analyse the 
pertinence of the study of both, financial structure and development, jointly. Again, in all 
the regressions we have included the banking indicators as control variables and the 
lagged financial indicators as independent ones.   
 
The third set of failure-determinants models focuses on the joint effects of the financial 
determinants on fragility. We summarise their results in Table 5.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 20 
Table 5. Financial Structure, Financial Development and Banking Crises 
( FSD specification) 
 
 
Model 
 
Aggregate 
 
Activity 
 
Size 
 
Efficiency 
 
 
Regression Indicators 
Structure Aggregate 
(lagged) 
-3.31*** 
(-4.55) 
- - - 
Structure Activity 
(lagged) 
- -2.16*** 
(-3.97) 
- - 
Structure Size 
(lagged) 
- - -2.26*** 
(-3.89) 
- 
Structure Efficiency 
(lagged) 
- - - -1.05*** 
(-3.27) 
Finance Aggregate 
(lagged) 
3.64*** 
(3.40) 
- - - 
Finance Activity 
(lagged) 
- 1.65*** 
(2.94) 
- - 
Finance Size 
(lagged) 
- - 1.60*** 
(2.84) 
- 
Finance Efficiency 
(lagged) 
- - - 0.23 
(0.76) 
Banking Activity -7.58*** 
(-4.95) 
-7.71*** 
(-5.27) 
-7.81*** 
(-5.37) 
-3.90*** 
(-3.52) 
Banking Size 4.64*** 
(3.39) 
5.54*** 
(4.24) 
5.84*** 
(4.33) 
5.02*** 
(3.88) 
Banking 
Concentration 
1.38 
(1.33) 
0.73 
(0.97) 
1.20 
(1.47) 
1.06 
(1.21) 
Observations 339 431 411 371 
LR-CHI2(5) 81.12*** 73.38*** 64.71*** 69.39*** 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -112.86 -153.80 -151.07 -129.13 
Notes: The dependent variable is the banking crisis dummy. The z statistics are given in parenthesis and 
are based on IRLS variance estimators. One, two and three asterisks indicate significance levels of 10, 5 
and 1 percent respectively. 
 
 
Table 5 shows that the likelihood of banking crises is inversely associated to the levels of 
the financial structure indicators and directly associated to the ones of financial 
development. All the determinants are statistically significant (1 percent significance 
level). The consistency of the estimated associations holds independently of the failure-
determinant model estimated. Financial structure and development, both, matter to 
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explain banking stability. Thus the evidence suggests that in market-based and 
underdeveloped financial systems the likelihood of banking crises is reduced.  
 
We should point out that these findings seem to contradict the ones of the previous 
section regarding the individual effects of financial development. Furthermore, they are 
counter-intuitive. It seems plausible to believe that this may occur due to a bias associated 
to the econometric specification of the models. We evaluate this possibility by using tests 
for omitted variables [See Table 6]. Such tests reject the null hypothesis of irrelevant 
variables in the unrestricted models. Thus according to our tests, we should analyse 
jointly the effects of financial structure and financial development.  
 
Table 6. Analysis of Specification Bias  
( Omitted Variable Tests) 
 
 
Model 
 
Aggregate 
 
Activity 
 
Size 
 
Efficiency 
 
 
Log Likelihood 
   FS specification 119.92 158.77 155.68 129.43 
   FD specification 127.01 163.41 160.53 135.18 
   FSD specification 112.86 153.8 151.07 129.13 
     
Omitted-Variables Likelihood Ratio (Unrestricted: FSD specification) 
LR-CHI2(1) 
(FS specification) 
14.12*** 9.94*** 9.22*** 0.60*** 
LR-CHI2(1) 
(FD specification) 
28.30*** 19.22*** 18.92*** 12.10*** 
     
Notes: We consider the financial-structure-and-development specification models as unrestricted and 
the financial-development and the financial-structure specification models as the restricted ones. One, 
two and three asterisks indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
 
The necessity to jointly analyse the determinants of banking crises make us to re-examine 
the conclusions obtained in the previous section. Such conclusions may be consistent with 
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the latter evidence if the financial development indicators are highly correlated with the 
financial structure ones; in other words, if there is multicollinearity between them.  Fixed-
effects (within) regressions confirm this intuition [See Appendix A]. Thus, the hidden 
fragility-enhancing effects of financial development can be unveiled only when we 
account for the degree to which a financial system is based on intermediaries or markets. 
 
Here we need to recall that multicollinearity is a sample phenomenon. A traditional 
procedure used to deal with it is to drop a variable in order to fit a regression. However 
we do not follow this practice to explain the likelihood of banking crises because of the 
results of the tests of omitted-variable bias. Indeed, t it is worthy to recall that the 
consequences of the specification bias introduced by omitting a financial indicator may be 
worse than the ones introduced by multicollinearity.
15
  Notice that omitted-variable bias 
induces the estimation of biased and inconsistent β estimators among other consequences.  
 
We summarise by indicating that the evidence suggests that the financial structure and 
development matter to assess the stability of banking systems. Particularly the 
assessments suggest that banking stability is enhanced in economies with market-based 
financial systems. Financial development reduces it.  However this fragility-enhancing 
effect can be unveiled only when we account for financial structure. Thus, financial 
structure and development jointly matter. Furthermore the size of the banking sector 
seems to reduce banking stability and its lending activity seems to enhance it. 
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7. Summary and discussion 
The issue of how financial systems affect the likelihood of banking crises is not well 
understood. Such understanding may be essential to avoid banking crises and their 
associated costs. Here we have shown the results of an investigation developed to study 
such issue with data for 211 countries during the period 1990-2003. Our investigation 
uses on fixed-effects logit models for panel-data and likelihood tests to analyse such 
issue. We have aimed at clarifying the individual and joint effects of financial structure 
and development by controlling for the effects of certain banking system features.  
 
Our main research finding suggests that the financial structure and financial development 
jointly matter to assess the stability of banking systems. Particularly the assessments 
imply that banking stability is enhanced in economies with market-based financial 
systems. Financial development reduces it.  However this fragility-enhancing effect can 
be unveiled only when we account for financial structure. Furthermore, our findings show 
that the size of the banking sector seems to reduce banking stability and its lending 
activity seems to enhance it. 
 
Our study leads us to some interesting implications: The first one is that the hypothesis 
that financial structure does not have independent effects on banking performances 
deserves to be re-examined again.
16
 According to our findings, financial structure seems 
                                                                                                                                                                             
15
 Statistically, the worst consequence of multicollinearity relates to the sensitivity of the β  estimators and 
their standard errors to small changes in data. Thus the coefficients may not be estimated with great 
precision and accuracy. 
16
 Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, (2001), conclude that financial structure per se appears to have no effects 
on bank margins, neither on bank profitability after controlling for both, bank and market development. The 
idea about the irrelevance of financial structure has support on studies that have focused on the determinants 
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to affect the likelihood of banking crises. However, we must recognise that the scope of 
the financial indicators used in our study is a very narrow one. Legal and regulatory 
regimes, financial and monetary institutions also shape intermediation activities. We have 
not considered them into our investigation due to the lack of available data.  
 
We believe that further studies on the relationship between financial structure and 
banking fragility should focus on these institutional features of the financial systems. 
Lender-of-last-resort activities, deposit insurance schemes and solvency regulations may 
change the behaviour of banks and the likelihood of banking crises. Currently, most of the 
discussions about how to avoid and manage crises deal with the institutional features that 
regulatory regimes should adopt. These discussions are particularly relevant in the context 
of institutions that can operate not only in a domestic, but also on a global scale. 
 
The second implication of our study relates to the fragility enhancing effects of financial 
development. These effects are particularly well-known in developing economies. 
Financial development, termed as liberalisation, frequently leads to financial crises in 
such economies [See Diaz-Alejandro (1985)]. This consideration and our previous results, 
make us believe that regulation must play an in-advance role there. Concretely, we think 
that regulations and supervised market-based oriented reforms should precede financial 
liberalisation in order to enhance banking stability.
17
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
of economic growth and investment. [See Levine (2002) and Ndikumana (2005), respectively]. Among 
these studies, the panel-data study of Loayza and Ranciere (2006), views financial fragility and economic 
growth, as the short and long-term consequences of financial development.   
17
 This statement is controversial. Usually development economists propose bank-based reforms to 
encourage financial and economic development [See Fry (1995)]. Among other arguments, they point out 
that banks are “better at mobilising savings, identifying good investments and exerting sound corporate 
control” [Levine (2002: 398)]. 
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However, this recommendation may not be implementable everywhere. Particularly, in 
developed economies, it may be unfeasible. Usually financial innovation arises there to 
avoid financial regulations [Cecchetti (2008)]. Nevertheless, this situation does not imply 
that there are not opportunities to enhance stability. Indeed the global financial crises that 
we are currently experiencing (2007-2008), may contribute to enhance financial stability. 
As we have mentioned, we cannot dismiss the possibility of bidirectional effects between 
financial development and banking crises. 
 
We believe that further studies on the joint impact of financial structure and development 
may be necessary to clarify and evaluate the statements indicated above. It is our belief 
that such studies will reveal us further insights that may contribute to improve our 
understanding of the contracting process and of the functioning of intermediaries and 
markets. Particularly we think that regulatory issues may be the most fruitful ones. 
Hopefully, results based on these investigations may have some relevance for enhancing 
the stability and performance of banking systems. 
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APPEDIX A 
Here we include the outcomes of the fixed-effects panel-data models that assess the 
relationships among the financial indicators. The regressions include constant terms to 
eliminate constant effects.  
 
Table A.1 Financial Structure and Financial Development 
 Fixed-Effects (within) Regressions 
 
Regressor/Regressed Variables 
 
 
 
Structure 
Aggregate 
 
Structure 
 Activity 
 
Structure 
Size 
 
Structure 
Efficiency 
 
 
Regression Indicators 
Finance Aggregate 
 
1.12*** 
(52.22) 
- - - 
Finance Activity 
 
- 0.80*** 
(79.44) 
- - 
Finance Size 
 
- - 0.63*** 
(48.37) 
- 
Finance Efficiency 
 
- - - 0.86*** 
(61.62) 
Constant 0.00 
(0.38) 
1.10*** 
(23.89) 
1.00*** 
(27.84) 
-6.71*** 
(-450.11) 
Observations 990 1408 1376 1120 
F 2726.87*** 6310.95*** 2339.85*** 3796.83*** 
R
2
 within 0.75 0.82 0.64 0.78 
R
2
 between 0.62 0.65 0.29 0.80 
R
2
 overall 0.61 0.70 0.35 0.77 
Corr(ui,Xb) -0.58 -0.55 -0.61 -0.39 
σu 1.19 1.29 1.09 0.98 
σe 0.39 0.55 0.47 0.47 
ρ 0.90 0.84 0.84 0.81 
F (Ho: ui=0) 52.98*** 40.63*** 37-13*** 36.88*** 
Notes: The t statistics are given in parenthesis. One, two and three asterisks indicate significance levels 
of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
 
Table A.1, shows that the financial structure indicators are positively and highly 
correlated to the financial development ones. All the associations are positive and 
statistically significant (1 percent significance level).  The economic interpretation of 
these results is that developed financial systems are associated to market-based ones. 
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APEDIX B 
 
Table B.1  Recognised Banking Crises per Country 
(1980-2003) 
 
umber Country Years  umber Country Years 
 
1 Aruba -  22 Bahrain  - 
2 Andorra -  23 Bahamas, The  - 
3 Afghanistan  -  24 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-2003 
4 Angola  1991-2003  25 Belarus  1995-2003 
5 Anguilla  -  26 Belize  - 
6 Albania  1992  27 Bermuda  - 
7 Netherlands Antilles -  28 Bolivia  1986-1988, 1994-2003 
8 United Arab Emirates  -  29 Brazil  1990, 1994-1999 
9 Argentina 1980-1982, 1989-1990, 1995-
1997, 2001-2003 
 30 Barbados  - 
10 Armenia  1994-1996  31 Brunei  1983-1987 
11 American Samoa -  32 Bhutan  - 
12 Antigua and Barbuda  -  33 Botswana  1994-1995 
13 Australia  1989-1992  34 Central African Republic 1976-1992 
14 Austria -  35 Canada  1983-1985, 
15 Azerbaijan 1995  36 Switzerland  - 
16 Burundi  1994-2003  37 Channel Islands  - 
17 Belgium  -  38 Chile  1976, 1981-1986, 
18 Benin 1988-1990  39 China  1990-1999 
19 Burkina Faso 1988-1994  40 Cote d'Ivoire  1998, 1989-1991 
20 Bangladesh 1986-1996  41 Cameroon  1987-1993, 1995-1998 
21 Bulgaria  1995-1997  42 Congo, Rep.  1992-2003 
Notes: 1) Financial structure and development data are extracted from the database of Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, (2006). 2) 
Data on banking crises are extracted from the datasets of Caprio and Klingebiel, (2003).   
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Table B.1  Recognised Banking Crises per Country 
(1980-2003) 
(Continued) 
 
umber Country Years  umber Country Years 
 
43 Colombia  1982-1987  65 France  1994, 1995 
44 Comoros  -  66 Faeroe Islands - 
45 Cape Verde  1993-2003  67 Micronesia, Fed. Sts. - 
46 Costa Rica  1987-2003  68 Gabon 1995-2003 
47 Cuba  -  69 United Kingdom 1974-1976, 1980-1999, 
48 Cayman Islands -  70 Georgia 1991 
49 Cyprus  -  71 Ghana 1982-1989, 1997-2003 
50 Czech Republic 1989-2003  72 Guinea 1985, 1993-1994 
51 Germany  1976, 1978-1980  73 Gambia, The 1985-1992 
52 Djibouti  1991-1993  74 Guinea-Bissau 1995-2003 
53 Dominica -  75 Equatorial Guinea 1983-1985 
54 
Denmark  1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 
1992 
 
76 
Greece 1991-1995 
55 Dominican Republic  -  77 Grenada - 
56 Algeria  1990-1992  78 Greenland - 
57 Ecuador  1980-1984, 1996-2003  79 Guatemala - 
58 Egypt, Arab Rep. 1980-1985, 1991-1995M  80 Guam - 
59 Eritrea  1993  81 Guyana - 
60 Spain  1977-1985  82 Hong Kong, China 1982-1986, 1998 
61 Estonia  1992-1995,  1998  83 Honduras - 
62 Ethiopia  1994, 1995,  84 Croatia 1996 
63 Finland  1991, 1992, 1994, 1995  85 Haiti - 
64 Fiji  -  86 Hungary 1991-1995 
Notes: 1) Financial structure and development data are extracted from the database of Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, (2006). 2) 
Data on banking crises are extracted from the datasets of Caprio and Klingebiel, (2003).   
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Table B.1  Recognised Banking Crises per Country 
(1980-2003) 
(Continued) 
 
umber Country Years  umber Country Years 
 
87 Indonesia 1994, 1997-2003  109 Liberia 1991-1995 
88 Isle of Man -  110 Libya - 
89 India 1993-2003  111 St. Lucia - 
90 Ireland -  112 Liechtenstein - 
91 Iran, Islamic Rep. -  113 Sri Lanka 1989-1993 
92 Iraq -  114 Lesotho 1988-2003 
93 Iceland 1985, 1986, 1993,  115 Lithuania 1995-1996 
94 Israel 1977-1983  116 Luxembourg - 
95 Italy 1990-1995  117 Latvia 1995-2003 
96 Jamaica 1994-2000  118 Macao, China - 
97 Jordan 1989, 1990  119 Morocco 1980-1985 
98 Japan 1991-2003  120 Monaco - 
99 Kazakhstan -  121 Moldova - 
100 Kenya 1985-1989, 1992-2003  122 Madagascar - 
101 Kyrgyz Republic 1990-1999  123 Maldives - 
102 Cambodia -  124 Mexico 1981-1991, 1994-1997 
103 Kiribati -  125 Marshall Islands - 
104 St. Kitts and Nevis -  126 Macedonia, FYR 1993-1994 
105 Korea, Rep. 1997-2003  127 Mali 1987-1989 
106 Kuwait 1980-1989  128 Malta - 
107 Lao PDR 1990-1995  129 Myanmar 1996-2003 
108 Lebanon -  130 Mongolia - 
Notes: 1) Financial structure and development data are extracted from the database of Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, (2006). 2) 
Data on banking crises are extracted from the datasets of Caprio and Klingebiel, (2003).   
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Table B.1  Recognised Banking Crises per Country 
(1980-2003) 
(Continued) 
 
umber Country Years  umber Country Years 
 
131 Northern Mariana  Islands -  153 Palau - 
132 Mozambique 1987-1995  154 Papua New Guinea 1989-2003 
133 Mauritania 1984-1993  155 Poland 1990-1999 
134 Montserrat -  156 Puerto Rico - 
135 Mauritius 1996  157 Korea, Dem. Rep. - 
136 Malawi -  158 Portugal - 
137 Malaysia 1985-1988, 1997-2003  159 Paraguay 1995-1999, 2001 
138 Mayotte -  160 French Polynesia - 
139 Namibia -  161 Qatar - 
140 New Caledonia -  162 Romania 1990-2003 
141 Niger 1983-2003  163 Russian Federation 1995-2003 
142 Nigeria 1990-1999  164 Rwanda 1991-2003 
143 Nicaragua 1986-1996  165 Saudi Arabia - 
144 Netherlands -  166 Sudan - 
145 Norway 1987-1993  167 Senegal 1988-1991 
146 Nepal 1988  168 Singapore  1982 
147 New Zealand 1987-1990  169 Solomon Islands - 
148 Oman -  170 Sierra Leone 1990-2003 
149 Pakistan -  171 El Salvador 1989 
150 Panama 1988-1989  172 San Marino - 
151 Peru 1983-1990  173 Somalia - 
152 Philippines 1981-1987, 1998-2003  174 Sao Tome and Principe 1980-1999 
Notes: 1) Financial structure and development data are extracted from the database of Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, (2006). 2) 
Data on banking crises are extracted from the datasets of Caprio and Klingebiel, (2003).   
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Table B.1  Recognised Banking Crises per Country 
(1980-2003) 
(Continued) 
 
umber Country Years  umber Country Years 
 
175 Suriname -  194 Uganda 1994-2003 
176 Slovak Republic 1991-2003  195 Ukraine 1997-1998 
177 Slovenia 1992-1994  196 Uruguay 1981-1984, 2002-2003 
178 Sweden 1991-1994  197 United States 1984-1991 
179 Swaziland 1995  198 Uzbekistan - 
180 Seychelles -  199 St. Vincent and the Grenadines - 
181 Syrian Arab  Republic -  200 Venezuela 1975-1989, 1994-1995 
182 Chad 1980-1989, 1992  201 Virgin Islands - 
183 Togo 1993-1995  202 Vietnam 1997-2003 
184 Thailand 1983-1987, 1997-2003  203 Vanuatu - 
185 Tajikistan 1996  204 West Bank and Gaza - 
186 Turkmenistan -  205 Samoa  - 
187 Timor-Leste -  206 Yemen, Rep. 1996-2003 
188 Tonga -  207 Serbia and Montenegro - 
189 Trinidad and Tobago 1982-1993  208 South Africa 1977, 1989-2003 
190 
Tunisia 1991-1995  
209 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1980-1989, 1991-1992, 
1994-2003 
191 Turkey 1982-1985, 1994, 2000-2003  210 Zambia 1995 
192 Taiwan, China 1983-1984, 1995, 1998  211 Zimbabwe 1995-2003 
193 Tanzania 1986-1999     
Notes: 1) Financial structure and development data are extracted from the database of Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, (2006). 2) 
Data on banking crises are extracted from the datasets of Caprio and Klingebiel, (2003).   
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